Welcome to Adobe GoLive 4

Mind and the World of Nature

This is a book manuscript that has been submitted to an academic press, but feedback is still welcome and might be incorporated into the final text.

Chapters are shared here in a draft form for purposes of professional feedback and discussion. All texts here are under the copyright of the author, Steven Horst. Please do not cite without permission from the author.

Questions or comments should be sent to the author, Steven Horst (mailto:shorst@wesleyan.edu)

Brief Overview

This book is a critique of naturalism in philosophy of mind. The first section seeks, by way of historical exposition, to differentiate and explain several different breeds of naturalism (reductive, nomological, and Darwinian) and why they have the appeal that they do. The second section explores the claims that certain features of the mental -- consciousness, qualia, meaning, and the first-person perspective -- cannot be EXPLAINED in naturalistic terms. It states the problems as posed by contemporary naturalist and antinaturalist philosophers and then tries to examine them by a series of case studies of what is really explained in various parts of cognitive science. The overall conclusion is that there is, in fact, a robust EXPLANATORY GAP. The third section examines the question of whether the existence of such an explanatory gap ought to be viewed as a problem from the perspective of philosophy of science--i.e., of whether some form of reduction has normative status in the sciences. Examination of recent work in philosophy of science yields the conclusion that local scientific domains (like biology and psychology) enjoy a great deal of autonomy, and their status is not dependent upon reducibility. Moreover, true reductions are quite rare in the sciences. Instead, there are a variety of weaker sorts of relations to be found between scientific domains. Section IV then turns to the question of whether this explanatory gap implies a METAPHYSICAL GAP as well. I argue that there is a straightforward prima facie argument that it does, and then consider various objections to this prima facie argument.

Chapters

(Links will download the .doc version of the chapter in question)

# Title Abstract Pages

Pt. 1

1 The Central Problem of Modern Philosophy The ambiguous notion of "naturalism" is developed as one possible response to the Early Modern problematic of how to bring the things we think most important about ourselves as human beings into contact with the ways the natural sciences portray the world of nature. Naturalism is schematically characterized as the view that the mind can be accommodated in the world of nature as described by the natural sciences. This schema requires 3 further disambiguations: (1) what is meant by "accommodation"? (explanation? Metaphysical determination?) (2) How do we see the natural sciences as understanding the world of nature? (3) Is this a positive or a normative claim. Answers to (2) based on Galilean, Newtonian and Darwinian styles of explanation are distinguished. This book will be concerned largely with Galilean-style ("Compositive") naturalism.

2 Naturalistic Explanation: The Method of Resolution and Composition A general characterization of compositive explanation is drawn from historically-important examples from 17^th century Rationalists and 20^th century Positivists. On this view, explanation is modeled upon mathematical or logical derivation or construction, and provides explanations that are conceptually adequate. Variations on how this style of explanation might be applied to the mind are briefly surveyed. This style of explanation is called by its Galilean name: the Method of Resolution and Composition (MRC)

3 Naturalistic Metaphysics: The Hierarchic Picture The corresponding metaphysical view is developed, in which all facts about the world are determined by microphysical facts. This is called the Hierarchic Picture (HP).

4 The Presumptive Case for Compositive Naturalism Historically important rationales for compositive naturalism are discussed: (1) the a prioristic motivations of the Raitonalists and Positivists, which are no longer prominent in philosophy of mind, (2) empirically-based arguments from "the collective evidence of modern science" that (a) features of the mind are already being compositively explained by the sciences of cognition, or (b) that a general if indirect case can be made from the generality of physics, or (c) arguments that the successes of other sciences on this model creates a normative expectation for how mental phenomena need to look. (3) A non-rational "projection" of a method (the MRC) into a metaphysics (the HP). This projection is argued to be epistemically suspect, and tantamount to a Kantian Idea of Reason.

5 Mary, the Bat and the Cartesian Gap: The Presumptive Case Against Compositive Naturalism Important arguments for an explanatory gap, and an additional metaphysical gap, between mind and matter are discussed: 3 Cartesian arguments, and 20^th century arguments by Nagel, Jackson, Searle and Chalmers.

6 Beyond Presumptive Cases An assessment of how one might move beyond merely presumptive cases for and against naturalism. Agenda for the remainder of the book are set out: (1) assess whether the kinds of explanations one finds in the sciences of cognition really do bridge the explanatory gap, (2) look more closely at the view of explanation propounded by the naturalist and see if it is good philosophy of science by contemporary standards, and (3) assess whether an explanatory gap would entail a metaphysical gap as well.

Pt II

7 Have We Naturalized the Mind? (1): The Sciences of Cognition A relatively brief but hopefully representative walk-through of two kinds of explanation that might be thought to close explanatory gaps: explanation of color vision (including its psychophysics, localization, and the formal properties of the cone-ganglion system), and Crick’s phase-locking account of binding. While there is considerable explanatory power in both cases, it does not bridge the explanatory gap, because, upon inspection, it turns out that both accounts presume qualia and their relation to brain states, rather than explaining them.

8 Have We Naturalized the Mind? (2): Philosophy Two philosophical attempts at naturalistic explanation are explored: the computational theory of mind and causal covariation semantics. Again, regardless of whatever explanatory power may be conferred by the accounts, they turn out to presume intentionality rather than explaining it in non-intentional terms.

Pt 3

9 Must We Naturalize the Mind? (1): Historical Alternatives Important historical alternatives to the MRC are discussed, in Newton’s rejection of a principled need for hypothetical microexplanation and its philosophical development by the Empiricists, and Darwin’s introduction of a nonreductive form of explanation (as argued by Lewontin, Levins, Bechtel, Kitcher, et al.) Newtonian and Darwinian approaches to psychology are briefly described, and it is argued that these do not represent viable alternatives for a naturalism that can support physicalism. (The Newtonian or nomic view because it is compatible with dualism and other non-physicalistic views, and the Darwinian view because it ultimately depends upon the plausibility of developmental mechanisms that would have to be cashed out reductively, and hence is not independent of the MRC)

10 Need we naturalized the mind? (2): The Lessons of Contemporary Philosophy of Science The MRC involves a number of views of the nature of scientific explanation that have been decisively rejected by contemporary philosophers of science: e.g., that explanations are (always) derivations or deductions, that the special sciences must be legitimated by their reducibility to physics, that true compositive explanations or reductions are common at the interstices between the sciences.

11 Laws and Idealization A particular issue in philosophy of science is explored: the nature of laws. Cartwright and others have argued convincingly that laws are not to be interpreted as universally quantified claims over a domain of objects and events. But what account are we to put in place of the received view? It is argued that laws be viewed as stating truths, but as involving idealizing moves that must be taken into account before one can assess the truth of their claims. These idealizing moves, however, present obstacles for the unity of science and for making connections between science and metaphysics.

12 Gaps, disunity and the Mind This chapter explores the implications of abandoning the idea that the special sciences are generally connected by compositive inter-domain explanations. With that older assumption in place, the explanatory gaps in the case of the mind stand out as a striking special case. Without it–or with the contrary assumption that explanatory gaps are to be found throughout the sciences–we need to rethink the problematic in philosophy of mind. The chapter does not champion one particular attitude towards this situation, but lays out several alternatives.

P 4

13 Explanatory Gaps and Metaphysics: The Main Argument A main argument is laid out to the effect that a principled inavailability of compositive explanation of A in terms of B entails that (Bà A) cannot be metaphysically necessary. This argument will be defended against various objections in chapters that follow it.

14 A Tour Through the Modal Bestiary An introduction to basic concepts of modal logic and possible worlds semantics

15 The Argument from A Posteriori Necessity This chapter investigates objections to the Main Metaphysical Argument (MMA) stemming from the New Semantics (NS) of Putnam and Kripke. The objection is that the MMA depends upon naïve assumptions about the connections between conceptual entailment and metaphysical necessity which have been overthrown by NS. Several interpretations of NS are considered. On each of them, either (a) the MMA is not undercut, or (b) it is undercut at the cost of Mysterianism and emergentism.

16 Mystery and Emergence The Mysterian/Emergentist alternative is considered. It is not found to be self-contradictory or incoherent, but it is argued that once one has made the mysterian turn, one is no longer in a position to argue for an emergentist account of the metaphysical basis of mind/body correlations in preference over other accounts.

17 Nomic Necessity This chapter explores another line of retreat that might be thought to preserve naturalism: namely, to treat mind/body relations as metaphysically contingent but nomic. In light of the reinterpretation of laws in chapter 12, it is necessary to reconsider how laws might be grafted onto a modal metaphysics. Several of these are explored. On those that are found to be coherent, the notion of "nomic necessity" devolves into my notion of empirical generalization, and it is argued that this is too weak a notion to fit within the original naturalist agenda, in that it does not rule out possibilities such as substance dualism.

18 Cognitive Pluralism and Possible Worlds Semantics Finally, we consider whether the interpretation of modal semantics in terms of possible worlds semantics (PWS) is consonant with the cognitive pluralism advocated at the end of the section on philosophy of science. It is argued cognitive pluralism can accept a very weak interpretation of PWS as a regimentation of modal discourse, but not a deeply realistic interpretation of universal quantification over worlds or states of affairs or propositions. As a result, PWS cannot be used to do any philosophical work that goes beyond the modal intuitions it is used to express.

19 Gaps, Disunity, and the Specialness of Mind This chapter is the metaphysical counterpart of Chapter 12, assessing how a pluralist framework might require us to reinterpret the problematic in philosophy of mind. Two problems in particular stand out: (1) If principled explanatory gaps lead to failures of supervenience, and principled explanatory gaps are found broadly in the sciences, then it looks as though there are failures of supervenience throughout the natural world. (2) Cognitive pluralism would seem to suggest that there are many disunities of mind as well, and this seems arguably to present a challenge to our self-image that is at least as threatening as that of reductionism.

Bibliography

#	Title	Abstract	Pages
Pt. 1
1	The Central Problem of Modern Philosophy	The ambiguous notion of "naturalism" is developed as one possible response to the Early Modern problematic of how to bring the things we think most important about ourselves as human beings into contact with the ways the natural sciences portray the world of nature. Naturalism is schematically characterized as the view that the mind can be accommodated in the world of nature as described by the natural sciences. This schema requires 3 further disambiguations: (1) what is meant by "accommodation"? (explanation? Metaphysical determination?) (2) How do we see the natural sciences as understanding the world of nature? (3) Is this a positive or a normative claim. Answers to (2) based on Galilean, Newtonian and Darwinian styles of explanation are distinguished. This book will be concerned largely with Galilean-style ("Compositive") naturalism.
2	Naturalistic Explanation: The Method of Resolution and Composition	A general characterization of compositive explanation is drawn from historically-important examples from 17^th century Rationalists and 20^th century Positivists. On this view, explanation is modeled upon mathematical or logical derivation or construction, and provides explanations that are conceptually adequate. Variations on how this style of explanation might be applied to the mind are briefly surveyed. This style of explanation is called by its Galilean name: the Method of Resolution and Composition (MRC)
3	Naturalistic Metaphysics: The Hierarchic Picture	The corresponding metaphysical view is developed, in which all facts about the world are determined by microphysical facts. This is called the Hierarchic Picture (HP).
4	The Presumptive Case for Compositive Naturalism	Historically important rationales for compositive naturalism are discussed: (1) the a prioristic motivations of the Raitonalists and Positivists, which are no longer prominent in philosophy of mind, (2) empirically-based arguments from "the collective evidence of modern science" that (a) features of the mind are already being compositively explained by the sciences of cognition, or (b) that a general if indirect case can be made from the generality of physics, or (c) arguments that the successes of other sciences on this model creates a normative expectation for how mental phenomena need to look. (3) A non-rational "projection" of a method (the MRC) into a metaphysics (the HP). This projection is argued to be epistemically suspect, and tantamount to a Kantian Idea of Reason.
5	Mary, the Bat and the Cartesian Gap: The Presumptive Case Against Compositive Naturalism	Important arguments for an explanatory gap, and an additional metaphysical gap, between mind and matter are discussed: 3 Cartesian arguments, and 20^th century arguments by Nagel, Jackson, Searle and Chalmers.
6	Beyond Presumptive Cases	An assessment of how one might move beyond merely presumptive cases for and against naturalism. Agenda for the remainder of the book are set out: (1) assess whether the kinds of explanations one finds in the sciences of cognition really do bridge the explanatory gap, (2) look more closely at the view of explanation propounded by the naturalist and see if it is good philosophy of science by contemporary standards, and (3) assess whether an explanatory gap would entail a metaphysical gap as well.
Pt II
7	Have We Naturalized the Mind? (1): The Sciences of Cognition	A relatively brief but hopefully representative walk-through of two kinds of explanation that might be thought to close explanatory gaps: explanation of color vision (including its psychophysics, localization, and the formal properties of the cone-ganglion system), and Crick’s phase-locking account of binding. While there is considerable explanatory power in both cases, it does not bridge the explanatory gap, because, upon inspection, it turns out that both accounts presume qualia and their relation to brain states, rather than explaining them.
8	Have We Naturalized the Mind? (2): Philosophy	Two philosophical attempts at naturalistic explanation are explored: the computational theory of mind and causal covariation semantics. Again, regardless of whatever explanatory power may be conferred by the accounts, they turn out to presume intentionality rather than explaining it in non-intentional terms.
Pt 3
9	Must We Naturalize the Mind? (1): Historical Alternatives	Important historical alternatives to the MRC are discussed, in Newton’s rejection of a principled need for hypothetical microexplanation and its philosophical development by the Empiricists, and Darwin’s introduction of a nonreductive form of explanation (as argued by Lewontin, Levins, Bechtel, Kitcher, et al.) Newtonian and Darwinian approaches to psychology are briefly described, and it is argued that these do not represent viable alternatives for a naturalism that can support physicalism. (The Newtonian or nomic view because it is compatible with dualism and other non-physicalistic views, and the Darwinian view because it ultimately depends upon the plausibility of developmental mechanisms that would have to be cashed out reductively, and hence is not independent of the MRC)
10	Need we naturalized the mind? (2): The Lessons of Contemporary Philosophy of Science	The MRC involves a number of views of the nature of scientific explanation that have been decisively rejected by contemporary philosophers of science: e.g., that explanations are (always) derivations or deductions, that the special sciences must be legitimated by their reducibility to physics, that true compositive explanations or reductions are common at the interstices between the sciences.
11	Laws and Idealization	A particular issue in philosophy of science is explored: the nature of laws. Cartwright and others have argued convincingly that laws are not to be interpreted as universally quantified claims over a domain of objects and events. But what account are we to put in place of the received view? It is argued that laws be viewed as stating truths, but as involving idealizing moves that must be taken into account before one can assess the truth of their claims. These idealizing moves, however, present obstacles for the unity of science and for making connections between science and metaphysics.
12	Gaps, disunity and the Mind	This chapter explores the implications of abandoning the idea that the special sciences are generally connected by compositive inter-domain explanations. With that older assumption in place, the explanatory gaps in the case of the mind stand out as a striking special case. Without it–or with the contrary assumption that explanatory gaps are to be found throughout the sciences–we need to rethink the problematic in philosophy of mind. The chapter does not champion one particular attitude towards this situation, but lays out several alternatives.
P 4
13	Explanatory Gaps and Metaphysics: The Main Argument	A main argument is laid out to the effect that a principled inavailability of compositive explanation of A in terms of B entails that (Bà A) cannot be metaphysically necessary. This argument will be defended against various objections in chapters that follow it.
14	A Tour Through the Modal Bestiary	An introduction to basic concepts of modal logic and possible worlds semantics
15	The Argument from A Posteriori Necessity	This chapter investigates objections to the Main Metaphysical Argument (MMA) stemming from the New Semantics (NS) of Putnam and Kripke. The objection is that the MMA depends upon naïve assumptions about the connections between conceptual entailment and metaphysical necessity which have been overthrown by NS. Several interpretations of NS are considered. On each of them, either (a) the MMA is not undercut, or (b) it is undercut at the cost of Mysterianism and emergentism.
16	Mystery and Emergence	The Mysterian/Emergentist alternative is considered. It is not found to be self-contradictory or incoherent, but it is argued that once one has made the mysterian turn, one is no longer in a position to argue for an emergentist account of the metaphysical basis of mind/body correlations in preference over other accounts.
17	Nomic Necessity	This chapter explores another line of retreat that might be thought to preserve naturalism: namely, to treat mind/body relations as metaphysically contingent but nomic. In light of the reinterpretation of laws in chapter 12, it is necessary to reconsider how laws might be grafted onto a modal metaphysics. Several of these are explored. On those that are found to be coherent, the notion of "nomic necessity" devolves into my notion of empirical generalization, and it is argued that this is too weak a notion to fit within the original naturalist agenda, in that it does not rule out possibilities such as substance dualism.
18	Cognitive Pluralism and Possible Worlds Semantics	Finally, we consider whether the interpretation of modal semantics in terms of possible worlds semantics (PWS) is consonant with the cognitive pluralism advocated at the end of the section on philosophy of science. It is argued cognitive pluralism can accept a very weak interpretation of PWS as a regimentation of modal discourse, but not a deeply realistic interpretation of universal quantification over worlds or states of affairs or propositions. As a result, PWS cannot be used to do any philosophical work that goes beyond the modal intuitions it is used to express.
19	Gaps, Disunity, and the Specialness of Mind	This chapter is the metaphysical counterpart of Chapter 12, assessing how a pluralist framework might require us to reinterpret the problematic in philosophy of mind. Two problems in particular stand out: (1) If principled explanatory gaps lead to failures of supervenience, and principled explanatory gaps are found broadly in the sciences, then it looks as though there are failures of supervenience throughout the natural world. (2) Cognitive pluralism would seem to suggest that there are many disunities of mind as well, and this seems arguably to present a challenge to our self-image that is at least as threatening as that of reductionism.