Symbols, Computation and Intentionality: A Critique of the Computational Theory of Mind by Steven Horst, Ph.D. Published by University of California Press, 1996 Cover Quotes Abstract Table of Contents Sample Text Review Notes Ordering Information Now only $19 (cloth!!) at U. Cal Press's Millenium Sale

Precis The idea that the mind is a digital computer has proven enormously influential in recent studies of cognition. But does viewing the mind as a computer solve any philosophical problems as well? Fodor and other advocates of the Computational Theory of Mind have claimed that it does: it provides an account of the intentionality of mental states and "vindicates" our commitment to mental states by showing how they can be compatible with materialism and with the generality of physics. In this comprehensive, finely argued critique, Steven Horst argues that in fact the computer metaphor solves no philosophical problems: the notion of symbolic representation employed by the computational theory cannot be used to explain intentionality, and as a result it cannot be used to vindicate the mental, either. The ordinary notion of symbolic meaning is dependent on conventions and intentions, and so cannot be used to explain intentionality without circularity, while weaker notions of representation fail to explain the emergence of meaning altogether. Horst then offers an alternative philosophical account of the importance of the computer metaphor in psychology, the Neutral Project that suggests a more useful way of comparing computational psychology with rival views emerging from connectionism and neuroscience. His account distinguishes the scientific good-making qualities of mathematization and microexplanation from specifically philosophical issues that turn upon the differences among notions like reduction, instantiation, supervenience, and realization. In short, he says, we do not know how to naturalize the mental in a way that sovles the mind-body problem to the satisfaction of philosophers, but empirical psychology can get on without such a naturalization. Machine computation may provide tools for fruitful empirical research in psychology even thouigh it solves no philosophical problems, and we can compare its successes with those of its rivals by examining what scientific good-making qualities they confer upon psychology. In making his case, Horst presents an extensive conventionalist analysis of symbols, sytax and symbolic meaning and defends it against the notion that there can be a "pure" nonconventional semantics for "abstract languages." In addition, he examines a number of related topics including the relation of mental meaning to semiotics, the limits of functional analysis, the alleged "theoretical" character of mental states, compositionality, and the prospects for a naturalistic theory of meaning. The discussion takes in a wide range of philosophical camps: mainline cognitive scientists, connectionists, phenomenologists, ordinary language philosophers, Wittgensteinians, and social constructionists. Original and persuasive, this book is certain to provoke controversy and stimulate debate. Professionals in the philosophy of mind will find a promising alternative to the conventional wisdom in cognitive science. Students will find a concise statement of this wisdom and a compelling criticism of it, one that challenges many deeply held beliefs about the mind.

Quotes from Cover "A first-rate contribution to the literature on the foundations of cognitive science, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of psychology. It is clear, powerfully argued, highly original, and provides one of the best general critiques to date of the claims of the advocates of the computational theory of mind." -Jay L. Garfield Hampshire College (Now at University of Tazmania) "A very substantial work, carefully done, directed at central issues in the foundations of cognitive science, and providing serious support for some unpopular conclusions." - Robert Cummins University of Arizona             Return to top

This book combines a critique of Fodor's Computational Theory of Mind (CTM) with a preliminary presentation of an alternative approach to computational psychology from the standpoint of history and philosophy of psychology. Parts I-III show that CTM fails to make good on its claims to solve the philosophical problems of accounting for the intentionality of mental states (by saying that it is "inherited" from the semantics of mental representations) or of "vindicating" intentional psychology by showing that it can be naturalized by treating the mind as a computer. If CTM uses the crucial terms 'symbol', 'syntax' and 'semantics' in the ordinary ways, the account turns out to be circular and regressive, because these notions are all convention- and intention-dependent to the core. (I make a case for this in Chapter 4 and defend it in Chapter 6 against the view that there are "abstract languages" with purely "formal" syntax and semantics, and that conventionality only comes into play with the adoption of these "abstract languages" by a speaker or a community. I argue that there are no abstract languages&emdash;only languages considered in the abstract.) If CTM does not use these terms literally, one is left with a strong form of machine functionalism that, upon examination, proves incapable of providing any explanation of semantics, and hence incapable of showing that semantics can be naturalized by treating the mind as a computer.

In Section IV, however, I argue that the philosophical bankruptcy of CTM does not imperil computational psychology, but does call for a view of its importance that distinguishes the "good-making" qualities of scientific research programmes from their ability to solve philosophical questions. Here I suggest that computation attempts to confer upon psychology two traditional virtues of mature sciences: mathematization and a strategy for micro-explanation. There are, of course, competing approaches to both of these ends coming from connectionism and neuroscience, and looking squarely at these good-making qualities gives us a way of comparing rival approaches. Finally, intentional psychology is not in need of vindication, because intentional states are data and not theoretical posits, and because ontological theories like materialism stand in the dock against actual descriptions and explanations, and not the other way around.

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Epigraph

Preface

Introduction

 

Part I-- Computationalism and its Critics

 

Chapter 1 -- The Computational Theory of Mind

1.1 Intentional States

1.2 Mental State Ascriptions in Intentional Psychology and Folk

1.3 CTM's Representational Account of Intentional States

1.4 Semantic Compositionality

1.5 Cognitive Processes

1.6 Formalization and Computation

1.7 The Computational Account of Cognitive Processes

1.8 Summary

Chapter 2 -- Computation, Intentionality and the Vindication of Intentional Psychology

2.1 CTM's Account of Intentionality

2.2 Intentionality

2.3 CTM, Intentionality and Semantics

2.4 The Virtues of the Account

2.5 CTM as the Basis for an Intentional Psychology

2.6 The Disrepute of Mentalism&emdash;A Brief History

2.7 Vindicating Intentional Psychology (1)

2.8 Vindicating Intentional Psychology (2)

2.9 Summary

Chapter 3 -- "Derived Intentionality"

3.1 Searle and Sayre's Criticisms

3.2 Three Implicit Criticisms

3.3 The Formal Symbols Objection

3.4 Derived Intentionality

3.5 The Ambiguity of "Derived Intentionality"

3.6 Causally Derived Intentionality

3.7 Assessing The Causally Derived Intentionality Objection

3.8 The Conceptual Dependence Objection

3.9 The Need for Semiotics

Part II --- Symbols, Computers and Thoughts

 

Chapter 4 -- Symbols -- An Analysis

4.1 Symbols

4.2 Markers, Signifiers, Counters

4.3 Markers

4.4 Signifiers

4.5 Counters

4.6 The Relationship of the Marker, Signifier and Counter

4.7 Four Modalities of Conventional Being

4.8 Four Ways of Being a Signifier

4.9 Four Modalities for Counters

4.10 The Nature and Scope of this Semiotic Analysis

4.11 The Form of Ascriptions of Intentional and Semantic Properties

4.12 Summary

 

Chapter 5 -- The Semantics of Thoughts and of Symbols in Computers

5.1 Semiotics and Mental Semantics

5.2 Symbols in Computers

5.3 A New Interpretation of 'Symbol' and 'Syntax'

5.4 Implications of a Separate Usage of 'Symbol'

 

Chapter 6 -- Rejecting Non-Conventional Syntax and Semanitcs for Symbols

6.1 A Criticism of the Semiotic Analysis

6.2 Initial Response

6.3 The Choice of Paradigms Examples

6.4 Further Objections

6.5 The Essential Conventionality of Markers

6.6 Syntax, Functional Role and Compositionality

6.7 What Functional Description Can't Do

6.8 The Possibility of Pure Semantics

6.9 Tarski's Semantics

6.10 "Pure Semantics" and "Abstract Languages"

6.11 Conclusion

Part III --- The Critique of CTM

 

Chapter 7 -- Semiotic-Semantic Properties, Intentionality, Vindication

7.1 A Brief Discussion of the Three Versions

7.2 Semiotic-semantic Properties and CTM's Account of Intentionality

7.3 Intentions, Conventions and the Representational Account

7.4 The Empirical Implausibility of the Account

7.5 The Irrelevance of Conventions and Intentions

7.6 Conflicts in the Notion of Representation

7.7 Circularity and Regress

7.8 The Interpretability-in-Principle Version

7.9 Applicability of these Criticisms

7.10 Two Possible Responses

7.11 Systemmatic Symbol-Manipulation

7.12 Causality and Computers

7.13 Compositionality and the Conventionality of Syntax

7.14 Semiotic-semantics and the Vindication of Intentional Psychology

7.15 Summary

 

Chapter 8 -- Causal and Stipulative Definitions of Semantic Terms

8.1 The Vocabulary of Computation in CTM

8.2 A Bowdlerized Version of CTM

8.3 The Problem of Semantics

8.4 A Stipulative Reconstruction of the Semantic Vocabulary

8.5 A Second Strategy

8.6 MR-Semantics and the Vindication of Intentional Psychology

8.7 Summary

 

Chapter 9 -- Prospects for a Naturalistic Theory of Content

9.1 Strong and Weak Naturalization

9.2 What is "the Mental"?

9.3 Phenomenology and the Mental

9.4 Phenomenology and Scientific Psychology

9.5 Why Phenomenology Cannot Be Naturalized

9.6 Naturalizing Broad Content

9.7 Naturalizing Narrow Content

9.8 Conclusion

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Part IV --- An Alternative Vision

Chapter 10 -- An Alternative Approach to Computational Psychology

10.1 A Story about the Maturation of Sciences

10.2 The Appeal of a Mature Psychology

10.3 Computation, Mathematization and Connectivity

10.4 The Implicit Form of Cognitive Psychology

10.5 Intentionality

10.6 A Re-Orientation in Philosophy of Cognitive Science

10.7 Computation and its Competition

 

Chapter 11 -- Intentionality without Vindication, Psychology without Naturalization

11.1 The Central Problem of Modern Philosophy

11.2 The "Received View"

11.3 Dialectical Possibilities

11.4 Psychology, the Mental and Causal-Nomological Explanation

11.5 Intentionality, Materialism and the Generality of Physics

11.6 The Commitments of the Special Sciences

11.7 Final Words

Appendix

Notes

Bibliography

Introduction

Symbols, Computation and Intentionality

Published by University of California Press

 

 

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